





The two decades following the fall of communism
have provided economists with a remarkable oppor-
tunity to study the consequences of radical changes
in economic institutions, i.e., in the rules of the game
and norms that underpin economic interaction.Tran-
sition has proved more protracted than anticipated –
a rapid catch-up by the central and eastern European
transition economies to European Union levels of
productivity has not occurred. A useful standard of
comparison is with the phase of rapid catch-up by the
southern European economies that began following
the liberalisation reforms around 1960.
Figure 1 presents PPP data on value added per em-
ployed worker, a broad measure of economy-wide la-
bour productivity. It takes France as the comparator
for two exercises:first for the catch-up of the southern
economies from 1960 and second, for the post-com-
munist catch-up from 1991. Sev-
eral points emerge from the com-
parison. First, with the exception
of Slovenia, the eastern European
countries were further behind
France in 1991 than were the south-
ern countries behind France in
1960 at the beginning of their catch-
up. Second, the southern catch-up
in the subsequent 17 years was
mostly more rapid than that in the
17 post-transition years.Third, the southern produc-
tivity catch-up had virtually stopped by 1977 – in
the subsequent 31 years, the labour productivity
gap with France scarcely changed.Against the per-
formance of its eastern European comparators,
eastern Germany’s performance was reasonably
good and its catch-up to France was similar to that
achieved by Greece from 1960 to 1977.
A substantial research effort has attempted to discov-
er why well-educated labour forces with good levels
of physical infrastructure in an era of financial global-
isation and trade integration were unable to take ad-
vantage of the apparently “low-hanging fruit” avail-
able by introducing existing technologies and to reap
the reward of rapid catch up. Much of this research
has pointed to the neglect at the outset of the transi-
tional period of market economy institutions.
The eastern German transition provides a useful
comparative case study. Unlike other transition eco-
nomies, eastern Germany acquired high quality and
credible market institutions by virtue of unification.
Yet its performance was in many ways similar to that
of its central and eastern European comparators: a
transitional recession followed by slow convergence.
eastern Germany’s experience of transition high-
lights the limited extent to which good institutions
alone can overcome 40 years of missing market ex-
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perience, especially during a period of increasingly
integrated global markets.
What was the binding constraint on catch-up?
The framework of growth diagnostics proposed by
Hausmann, Rodrik and Velasco (2006) can be used
to analyze the reasons for a slow catch-up in the
transitional period.The initial distinction is between
a situation in which the growth of private investment
and entrepreneurship are inhibited by (a) too low a
rate of return on private investment and (b) too high
a cost of finance. If there is evidence of an abun-
dance of profitable projects but the high cost of fi-
nance prevents them from being undertaken, the
question arises of whether it is poor access to inter-
national finance or poor local finance that is at fault.
In the case of poor local finance,this could be due to
weak intermediation or because of low savings.
In the left-hand side of the tree (Figure 2), the avail-
ability of finance is not binding – rather, it is the low
rate of return on investment that is the problem. This
could be because of the effect of poor complementary
factors such as unfavourable geography, inadequate
physical infrastructure or weak human capital in re-
ducing expected private returns.Alternatively,govern-
ment failures could be responsible by raising micro or
macroeconomic risk.The final branch points to market
failures and the associated lack of good projects.
It is difficult to argue that the catch-up speed of tran-
sition economies was hampered by lack of access to
finance. On the contrary, a striking feature of transi-
tion was that unlike typical developing countries,the
CEEC transition economies defied the so-called
Lucas Paradox: capital flowed to these economies
and they did not have repeated balance of payments
crises (e.g., Prasad et al. 2007). Moreover internation-
al banks largely took over local banking networks,
providing expertise and access to international capi-
tal markets. For the CEECs and eastern Germany, it
seems reasonable to presume that we are in the left-
hand part of the decision tree: the rate of return, not
the cost of or access to finance was the problem.
We can also rule out poor complementary factors –
these countries were situated contiguous to the Eu-
ropean Union market and a positive legacy of com-
munism was to leave levels of human capital and
skills, and physical infrastructure higher than those
of the market economy benchmark at similar levels
of GDP per capita (e.g., Mitra et al. 2010, chapter 5).
A large body of research literature has emerged in
the past decade arguing that it was institutional
weakness (government failure) that hampered the
rapid catch up of the CEECs (e.g., Rodrik 2006).
Effective legal systems, reliable and predictable tax
and customs administration, norms and rules to con-
trol corruption, and so on were not created over-
night. New owners had to be found for large enter-
prises and it became clear that privatisation in the
absence of adequate corporate governance failed to
lift the performance of privatised enterprises above
that of state owned ones (Estrin et al. 2009). Foreign
owned firms performed notably better than those
privatised to domestic owners.
Recent evidence suggests that political integration in
the European Union helps explain why the CEECs
defied the Lucas paradox (Fried-
rich et al.2010).A plausible chan-
nel is that by creating expectat-
ions among foreign investors of a
commitment to institutional re-
form, political integration facili-
tated the positive role of financial
integration in promoting catch-
up.If government failure or institu-
tional weakness was a likely cause
of slow catch-ups in the CEECs,it
was prima facie less plausible as a
binding constraint in eastern Ger-
many because of the transfer of
western German institutions.East-
ern Germany is at the extreme end
of the political integration contin-
Growth depends on (rate of return – real interest rate)




























What is the Binding Constraint on Growth where Private Investment and Entrepreneurship are Low?
Source: Hausmann, Rodrik and Velasco (2006).
Figure 2uum.However,institutions do not only involve “rules
on the books” but also norms, and recreating market
economy norms was not immediate even in eastern
Germany. Alesina and Fuchs-Schuendeln (2007)
showed that eastern Germans continued to have dif-
ferent attitudes to state intervention than western
Germans,and argued that such differences were like-
ly to persist for another generation.
It is also possible that western German – as com-
pared with generic – market institutions were mis-
matched with the needs of the transitional eastern
German economy (e.g., Carlin 1998). The core ex-
port-oriented sector of the western German econo-
my is characterised by a number of specialised insti-
tutional arrangements involving among others unions,
employers’ associations, works councils, the commit-
ment to transferable skills training by companies,
technology transfer institutions and various state-,
quasi-state and private organisations at the federal,
Land and local level. For example, it is argued that
unions, employers’ associations and works councils
play important roles in delivering wage compression
and employer commitment to training that lie be-
hind the high-skills “equilibrium” of the western
German core economy (e.g., Hall and Soskice 2001).
The most well-known example of institutional trans-
fer to eastern Germany was the recruitment of east-
ern German workers by western German unions, and
the participation of the Treuhandanstalt in wage-set-
ting. Combined with the extension of social security
entitlements, this placed a high floor under wages.
This rendered unprofitable much of the capital
stock, producing the rapid deindustrialisation of
eastern Germany and raised the bar for the required
productivity level of new projects if they were to be
profitable.Once western German companies rapidly
revised downwards their initial expectations of ac-
cessing buoyant markets in the former Soviet bloc
via the expansion of production facilities in eastern
Germany, it proved impossible to replicate the west-
ern German core economy and its institutional con-
text in the new Bundesländer.Eastern Germany was
left with the cost burden of the wage-setting and
social security system without its micro-institutional
benefits.
The federal government was forced to step in to deal
with problems arising from the failure of the western
German model to operate in the east. Combined
with the associated fiscal burdens, this led to impor-
tant changes in policy and institutions in the Federal
Republic as a whole, culminating in the Hartz IV
welfare reforms. Nevertheless, the export-oriented
core of the western German economy retained its
self-organizing capacity (as reflected in the substan-
tial restructuring and real depreciation achieved
over the post 2000 period; Carlin and Soskice 2009).
Yet in spite of the formal transfer of institutions, the
export-oriented core did not extend its scale through
replication in eastern Germany. The experience of
eastern Germany over the past two decades was one
of institutional adaptation – most obviously in the
low membership of eastern German companies in
employers’ associations and the associated limited
coverage of collective wage agreements in eastern
Germany (Paqué 2009).
In spite of these caveats,institutional quality,in the
sense of the credibility and efficiency of the core
market economy institutions of a functioning legal
system, control of crime and corruption, and the
efficient administration of taxes and customs were
established quickly in eastern Germany. We are
therefore led to turn to the final branch in the diag-
nostic tree diagram – market failures – in order to
pin down the binding constraint on eastern
German growth.
Hausmann et al. (2006) explained the “market fail-
ure” problem in a less advanced economy as fol-
lows: “The development process is largely about
structural change: it can be characterised as one in
which an economy finds out – self-discovers – what
it can be good at, out of the many products and
processes that already exist”(p.18).In eastern Ger-
many’s case, this problem was compounded be-
cause the floor on real wages set by the political set-
tlement (including the need to prevent mass migra-
tion to western Germany) meant it needed to “self-
discover” at a point much closer to the technology
frontier than typical for a developing or transition
country. New ideas for tradeables were required in
order to replace the old activities rendered unprof-
itable by the real exchange rate and by openness to
international competition. Opening up to interna-
tional trade and capital flows does not automatical-
ly generate knowledge of profitable niches.Self-dis-
covery is inhibited by learning and coordination ex-
ternalities.In the core of the western German econ-
omy, a complex institutional matrix promotes the
spillover of technological and marketing informa-
tion and the coordination of lumpy upstream and
downstream investments. But as noted above, this
was not reproduced in the east.
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Moreover, eastern Germany faced problems of self-
discovery even in non-tradeables. Normally in the
sheltered sector, domestic firms have the opportuni-
ty to benefit from monopolistic innovation rents.But
even in non-tradeables, the first-mover advantages
for local suppliers in eastern Germany were often
taken by western German firms – eastern German
firms immediately faced “foreign”suppliers and hence
lower profits from “innovation” in such markets.
What is the scale of the problem still faced by east-
ern Germany? The evolution of the “export base” 
Transition economies left the planning era with over-
sized industrial sectors relative to a market economy
benchmark. Eastern Germany’s rapid deindustriali-
sation following unification led it to overshoot the
market economy benchmark. One reflection of this
is its very low employment rate in industry. Figure 3
compares employment rates in industry (excluding
construction) in eastern Germany with a number of
transition economies, and with western Germany.
There is a scarcity in eastern Germany of “export-
base”jobs:these jobs are involved directly or indirect-
ly in the production of goods and services sold beyond
the region.A lagging region lacks sufficient jobs of this
kind and is characterised by dependence on the cen-
tral government to support living standards. Support
arises from benefit payments and from the financing
of government employment, where pay scales are set
nationally.In principle there are two ways to eliminate
such regional economic weakness – potential workers
move to the other region, i.e., to western Germany
and/or new jobs are created in eastern Germany.
For political reasons, it is implausible for the entire
adjustment to take place through the movement of
population, and for economic reasons, it is infeasible
for it to take place through the creation of new ex-
port base jobs.A satisfactory adjustment path would
therefore be likely to involve both processes (Row-
thorn 2000).What is an unsatisfactory outcome? An
unsatisfactory outcome is a Mezzogiorno scenario
where excess population remains in the lagging re-
gion and local economic development is too weak to
absorb it: productivity fails to converge and living
standards are sustained by federal transfers. After a
brief burst of adjustment in the 1960s, the Italian
south was characterised by the Mezzogiorno sce-
nario (Boltho et al. 1997).
Using regional data for Germany, it is possible to
make a crude calculation of the development of em-
ployment in tradeables, private non-tradeables and
the government (i.e., non-market non-tradeable)
sector. Employment in tradeables is defined by em-
ployment in agriculture, mining and manufacturing
plus “extra”employment in finance and business ser-
vices. For each year, the region in Germany with the
lowest  ratio of employment in finance and business
services to population was used to define the share
of employment in this sector that could be viewed as
non-tradeable, i.e., producing services required to
support the local population. The remainder of em-
ployment in finance and business services in each
region was defined as part of the “tradeable” sector.
Employment in the government sector was defined
as that in “public administration, defence and social
security”.The results highlight the differences in the
deployment of resources in eastern and western Ger-
many – the employment rate deficit of eastern Ger-
many is large in tradeables at
some 8 percentage points.The em-
ployment rate in private non-trade-
ables is also markedly lower in
eastern Germany.
Using 1991 as the base year, Fi-
gure 4 plots the evolution of the
working-age population and em-
ployment in eastern Germany re-
lative to Germany as a whole.The
working-age population in east-
ern Germany fell by 5 percent re-
lative to Germany over the peri-
od. The chart makes clear that
employment fell by much more.
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Figure 3struction boom (reflected in the bulge in eastern
Germany’s share of employment in private non-
tradeables), relative employment growth in both the
government and in private non-tradeables evolved
in line with relative population. This is what would
be expected since employment in non-tradeables
serves the local population.The normalisation of the
eastern German economy would involve bringing
the employment in tradeables and population lines
closer together: either by population draining from
eastern Germany and/or by rising employment in
tradeables,which would tend to stabilise the working
age population and the associated non-tradeables
employment. Given the loss of “export base” jobs in
the initial phase of the eastern German transition,
this remains a substantial task. Nevertheless, Figure
4 indicates that both adjustment processes discussed
above were present in eastern Germany from
around the year 2000.
Figure 5 presents the employment
rates in eastern and western Ger-
many for tradeables and the two
components of non-tradeables. In
western Germany the rising over-
all employment rate was driven
by private non-tradeables and a
steady rise in the employment
rate in the government sector.The
upturn in eastern Germany’s
employment rate over recent
years was the result of the re-
covery of the employment rate in
private non-tradeables to a level
similar to the peak achieved dur-
ing the post-unification construc-
tion boom, the stabilisation and
slight upturn in tradeables,and the
continued rise in the employment
rate in the government sector.
A similar exercise can be con-
ducted for each Land (Carlin
2010). The clearest contributions
to the amelioration of the region-
al problem are in Thüringen and
Sachsen where employment rates
in tradeables are rising toward
the western German norm. How-
ever, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern
appears to have the emerging
characteristics of a Mezzogiorno
region with little sign of closure of the huge employ-
ment rate gap in tradeables. It would appear that
emigration is too weak to remove the surplus labour,
and local economic development is too weak to ab-
sorb the “stayers”.The high employment rate in the
government sector in this region is consistent with
the decline of the region and its dependence on
transfers.
Although the employment rate gaps in tradeables
remain large, the achievements of eastern German
development are tangible and suggest that designat-
ing eastern Germany as a whole as trapped in a Mez-
zogiorno scenario may be premature. Nevertheless,
the challenges to creating an adequate export base
remain substantial.
Buch and Toubal (2009) provide evidence of persis-
tent differences between eastern and western
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Germany in their integration in international trade.
They show that eastern German Länder trade much
less with the rest of the world than western German
ones, had fewer parents of multinational companies
and a lower share of inward FDI. Buch and Toubal
(2009) showed that there was only a slow conver-
gence of eastern to western German levels.The meth-
odology is well-designed to show a causal effect from
lower openness to lower GDP per capita, highlight-
ing the consequences of eastern Germany’s limited
success in discovering its sources of comparative
advantage.
In the absence of policy instruments directly able to
remove the market failures inhibiting the develop-
ment of eastern Germany’s export base,real deprecia-
tion is essential. Figure 6 shows that nominal wage
restraint and more rapid hourly productivity growth
both contributed to eastern Germany’s improved
competitiveness in manufacturing since 2000.It is pro-
ductivity catch-up that made the greater contribution.
The chart also makes clear that productivity improve-
ment was accompanied by the stabilisation of hours
worked in manufacturing in eastern Germany. Money
wage growth was below but close to that in western
German manufacturing – reflecting the outcome in
wage-setting of the conflicting pressures of a persis-
tently weaker labour market in eastern Germany and
the much more rapid growth of relative productivity.
The success of eastern Germany in achieving a sub-
stantial real depreciation vis-à-vis western Germany
is all the more notable in the light of Germany’s
improved competitiveness versus other members of
the eurozone since 1999. Figure 7 shows the evolu-
tion of real exchange rates among the EU-27 coun-
tries. Germany’s real depreciation is evident both as
compared with southern European eurozone mem-
bers in the left panel and as com-
pared with central and eastern
European transition economies
in the right panel.
The difficulty of achieving lower
unit cost increases without the
help of nominal depreciation is
reflected in the cumulative com-
petitiveness gaps (and associated
widening of trade deficits) that
now exist in a number of euro-
zone countries.The adaptation of
the wage-setting system and pro-
ductivity improvements achieved
in eastern Germany are a notable
success.
Conclusions 
Eastern Germany’s experience of
transition highlights the limited
extent to which good institutions
alone can overcome 40 years of
missing market experience, espe-
cially during a period of increas-
ingly integrated global markets.
The eastern German case brings
to the fore the problem of finding
a niche in the international divi-
sion of labour. However, there
are signs of slow improvement in
eastern German performance.
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Figure 7not seem that the Mezzogiorno scenario is an appro-
priate characterisation.
Setting eastern Germany’s performance within a
broader context highlights the contrast between its
success in raising competitiveness and the erosion of
competitiveness among a number of southern euro-
zone members. However, the speed of catch-up of
eastern Germany is very slow and its continuation
depends on the steady growth of its small poles of
tradeables success. Given the evidence that agglom-
eration and networks are important, well-designed
industrial policy to foster investment and job cre-
ation in the nodes of development that have estab-
lished themselves is more likely to be successful than
the application of “watering can” support to the
region as a whole.
Finally, eastern German catch-up would be assisted
by a more balanced pattern of growth in western
Germany than was characteristic of the 2000s before
the global economic crisis.A shift toward growth less
reliant on net exports in western Germany associat-
ed with stronger growth of real wages, consumption
and investment would help reduce tensions and con-
straints on growth in the eurozone (where 40 percent
of Germany’s exports are sold). If the decoupling of
eastern Germany’s wage-setting system is successful-
ly maintained, the region could gain in such a sce-
nario from a further boost to its competitiveness and
from more buoyant growth of markets in Germany
and in the eurozone more broadly.
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